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Recent Developments

State v. Bell:
A Defendant's Knowing and Voluntary Waiver of a Jury Trial Does Not Require
Specific In-Court Advice to Defendant with Respect to the Unanimity
Requirement
By Cheryl F. Matricciani

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a
defendant may knowingly and
voluntarily waive the right to a jury
trial without specific reference to the
unanimity requirement during in-court
advice given to a defendant regarding
whether to elect a court or jury trial.
State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d
311 (1998). The court's ruling
clarified the knowing and voluntary
standard that a trial court must apply
when accepting a defendant's waiver
ofajurytrial under revised Maryland
Rule 4-246(b).
Wilbur Bell ("Bell") appeared
before Judge Michele D. Hotten
("Judge Hotten") in the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County on
charges of second degree rape,
assault and battery, attempted rape,
and assault with intent to rape. Id. at
711, 720A.2dat312. At the start of
trial, Bell informed the court of his
intentto waive ajury trial. Id. at 712,
720 A.2d at 313. Bell was
questioned by both his attorney and
Judge Hotten about his decision and
Bell was advised that the State must
prove the charges beyond a
reasonable doubt, before either a
twelve-personjury, or a member of
the bench. Id. at 714, 720 A.2d at
313. Bell acknowledged that his
decision to waive a jury trial was made
freely and voluntarily. Id. The court
accepted Bell's waiver and Bell was

subsequently convicted on all counts.
!d. at 712-13, 720 A.2d at 312.
The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland reversed the decision,
holding that the circuit court had failed
to sufficiently advise Bell of his right
to a jury trial because Bell was not
instructed on the unanimity
requirement setting forth that all twelve
jurors must agree to render a guilty
verdict. Id. at 712, 720 A.2d at 312.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari on the State's
petition to consider whether Maryland
Rule 4-246(b) requires an
examination ofthe defendant regarding
jury unanimity. Id. at 713, 720 A.2d
at 313.
The court of appeals addressed
the requirement that a defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waive the
right to a jury trial by reviewing an
earlier decision where the court
considered the requirement that a
defendant have "full knowledge" ofthe
right to a jury trial as specified by
former Maryland Rule 735(d). Id. at
714,720 A.2d at 314. In Countess
v. State, 286 Md. 444, 408 A.2d
1302 (1979), the court held that the
term full knowledge, includes, among
other factors, the defendant's
understanding "that in a jury trial all
12 jurors must agree that he is so guilty
but in a court trial the judge may so
find." Id. at 715, 720 A.2d at 314
(quoting Countess, 286 Md. at 455,

408 A.2d at 1307-08).
The court emphasized that its
decision in Countess was made
before the January 1, 1982,
modification of Rule 735 which
deleted the full knowledge
requirement. Id. at 716, 720 A.2d
at 314. The court noted that in the
current form of Maryland Rule 4246, the full knowledge requirement
has been replaced so that "a trial court
may now accept a waiver if it is
satisfied that the waiver is made
'knowingly and voluntarily. '" Id. at
716-17, 720 A.2d at 315.
The court then examined the
knowing and voluntary standard in
absence of the full knowledge
requirement. Id. at 717, 720 A.2d
at 315. Specifically, the court
addressed whether explicit reference
to the unanimity requirement during
in-court advice is necessary for the
defendant to knowingly waive the
right to a jury trial. Id. The court
analyzed the modification to former
Rule 73 5(d) in acco,rdance with the
canons of statutory construction,
which required the court to "ascertain
and effe!mate the intention of the
legislature." Id. (quoting Oaks v.
Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660
A.2d 423, 429 (1995)). In so doing,
the court first looked to the actual
language of the statute, and then to
the purpose of the legislation to
determine "what different standard,
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if any, was created when the rule was
modified." Id.
In analyzing the plain meaning of
former Rule 735(d), the court
reviewed the definition ofthe words
"full" and "knowingly." Id. at 71920, 720 A.2d at 316. Determining
that full means complete and entire,
and knowingly means conscious or
intelligent, the court concluded that
full knowledge under Countess,
compelled the court to completely
explain all aspects of a defendant's
rightto ajury trial, including, the jury's
function at trial and the defendant's
right to be tried by a jury. Id. at 720,
720 A.2d at 316. (quoting THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGUSH LANGUAGE 573, 672 (unabr.
ed. 1983); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
672,872 (6th ed. 1990». The court
further noted that in contrast to the full
knowledge requirement, a knowing
and voluntary waiver under current
Rule 4-246 requires a defendant to
do the following: (1) recognize that the
defendant is surrendering the right to
a jury trial, (2) possess a general
understanding of the nature of a jury
trial; and (3) voluntarily waive that
right. ld.
The court next explored the
legislative intent and found that at the
time of Countess, the Rules
Committee proposed an entire redraft
of Rule 735. Id. at 723, 720 Md. At
318 . Specifically, the Rules
Committee recommended that acoUIt
could not accept a defendant's waiver
ofthe jury trial right until the court was
satisfied that the defendant
understood: (1) the right to be tried
by ajury of twelve persons or by a
judge without a jury, and (2) that a
29.2 U. Bait L.F. 72

finding of guilt in a jury trial required
that all twelve jurors agreed to the
defendant's guilt. Id. (citing SeventyFifth Report of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 2-3 & app. (Oct. 26,
1981». The court noted that both
proposals were rejected, with the
motion to remove the unanimity
language passing by a vote of5-2. Id.
at 724, 720 A.2d at 318 (citing Rules
Order, 8 Md. Reg. 1928-30 (1981);
Minutes of Meeting of Court of
Appeals, 3 (Nov. 6, 1981». The
court emphasized that the rejection of
the Committee's proposals "implies
that we wished to move away from
the rigidity ofthe former rule 735 and
Countess." Id. The court concluded,
therefore, that under Rule 4-246, the
judge must be certain only that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived the right to a jury trial. Id.
In determining whether a waiver
ofthe jury trial right is knowing and
voluntary, the court adopted a facts
and circumstances analysis as applied
in two earlier court of appeals
opinions. Id at 724-25, 700 A.2d
at 319. In Hall v. State, 321 Md.
178, 183, 582 A.2d 507,510 (1990),
the court upheld a conviction finding
that the defendant possessed the
essential knowledge of the right to a
jury trial even though the trial court
had failed to provide the defendant
with details about this right, including
the jury selection process. Id. In
Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 31-32,
590 A.2d 550, 551 (1991), the trial
court questioned the defendant to
decide ifhe understood what ajury
trial was and determined that he
waived the right freely and voluntarily.

Id. at 725-26, 720 A.2d at 319. The
defendant's affirmative response, the
court concluded, did not amount to
the required comprehension ofthe jury
trial right required by the rule. Id
Applying a facts and
circumstances analysis to the instant
case, the court reasoned that although
the trial court did not advise Bell of
the unanimity requirement, Bell was
instructed on the fundamentals of a
jury trial. Id. at 726-27, 720 A.2d
320. In particular, the court found that
the trial court cautioned Bell that a jury
consists of twelve people, and that a
jury or judge would have to find Bell
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 727, 720 A.2d at 320. The court,
therefore, held that under the
circumstances, Bell's discussion with
defense counsel and the trial court
provided Bell with adequate
information about his right to ajury
trial such that he possessed the
requisite knowledge to knowingly
waive his right to a jury trial. Id. at
730, 720 A.2d at 321. The court did,
however, recognize that this issue
should be revisited, and referred the
question of whether a defendant
should be expressly advised of the
unanimity requirement to the Rules
Committee for consideration and
recommendation. Id.
In Bell v. State, the court held
that advice given to a defendant with
respect to the unanimity requirement
is no longer necessary for a trial court
to accept a defendant's waiver ofthe
right to a jury trial. When deciding to
waive the constitutional right to a jury
trial, it is paramount that a defendant
understands t.1}e purpose and function
of the jury. Such understanding
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encompasses the fact that a jury of
twelve peers must unanimously
decide the defendant's fate. Without
this pivotal piece of infonnation a
defendant may opt for a bench trial
based on a mistaken beliefthat it takes
only one person on the jury to find
the defendant guilty, and, therefore, the
probability ofbeing found guilty is the
same if either a judge or a jury hears
the evidence. This decision by the
court of appeals provides room for
this mistaken belief By providing an
explanation of the unanimity
requirement, the court ensures that a
defendant does not unintentionally
relinquish the constitutional right to a
jmy trial.
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